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Retail industries are an important part of today’s economies. They employ a large fraction of
the labor force, play a key role in the adoption and diﬀusion of new information technologies,
and are closely related to the development and conﬁguration of urban life. This paper
presents an estimable dynamic structural model of an oligopoly retail industry. The model
can be estimated using panel data of local retail markets with information on new entries,
e x i t sa n dt h es i z ea n dg r o w t ho fi n c u m b e n tﬁrms. In our model, retail ﬁrms are vertically
and horizontally diﬀerentiated, compete in prices, make investments to improve the quality
of their businesses, and decide to exit or to continue in the market. The model extends in
two important ways the entry-exit model estimated in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007, AM
hereafter). First, it includes ﬁrm size and growth as endogenous variables. And second,
the empirical model has two sources of permanent unobserved heterogeneity: local-market
heterogeneity and ﬁrm heterogeneity. This allows the researcher to control for potentially
important sources of bias when using ﬁrm panel data with many local markets and several
time periods. Not accounting for market unobserved heterogeneity can lead to biases in the
estimation of those structural parameters that represent strategic interactions between ﬁrms’
decisions. Market heterogeneity induces a positive correlation between ﬁrms’ decisions that
can be spuriously confounded with positive strategic interactions. It is also well-known in
panel data econometrics that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity across ﬁrms induces biases
in the parameters that generate structural state dependence, e.g., investment costs. We
extend the Nested Pseudo Likelihood estimation method in AM to deal with both forms
of permanent unobserved heterogeneity. This note contributes to the emerging literature
on the estimation of empirical games of industry dynamics (see also Patrick Bajari, Lanier
Benkard and Jonathan Levin, 2007, Martin Pesendorfer and Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, 2002,
and Ariel Pakes, Michael Ostrovsky, and Steven Berry, 2007).
1In a related paper (Aguirregabiria, Mira and Roman 2006, AMR herafter) we use this
model to study the sources of cross-industry heterogeneity in the dynamics of market struc-
ture. We use annual panel data from a census of Chilean ﬁrms collected by the Chilean
Servicio de Impuestos Internos (Internal Revenue Service) for the period 1994-2000. For
every establishment paying sales taxes, this data set reports its industry, at the ﬁve-digit
level, its annual revenue, and the district where the establishment is located. Competition in
retail industries occurs at the local level and we consider districts as local markets. We ﬁnd
large cross-industry heterogeneity along several dimensions of market structure and industry
dynamics, e.g., entry and exit rates, Herﬁndhal index, the relationship between ﬁrm size and
market size, or the relationship between ﬁrm growth and ﬁrm size. We estimate the model
separately for each retail industry and use these estimates to evaluate the role that product
diﬀerentiation, economies of scale, exogenous entry costs, and endogenous sunk costs play
in explaining the observed cross-industry heterogeneity.
I. The Model
In order to better understand the role of some assumptions and features of the model,
i tw i l lb eh e l p f u lt od e s c r i b et h et y p eo fd a t at h a tw ew i l lu s et oe s t i m a t et h i sm o d e l .W e
have panel data of M isolated retail markets (e.g., small towns) over T years. We look at a
particular retail industry, e.g., hotels, car dealers, or supermarkets. For this industry and for
each of the M markets, we have a panel of active ﬁrms. We observe ﬁrms’ annual revenue and
entry and exit decisions during the sample period. The equilibrium of our model provides
predictions for the evolution of these variables in a market.
Consider a local market for a retail product. The market is populated by consumers
and ﬁrms. We index ﬁrms by i. Time is discrete and indexed by t.A t p e r i o d t there
are St consumers, Nin
t incumbent ﬁrms operating in the market, and Nout
t ﬁrms which are
not active but are potential entrants, i.e., they may choose to operate in the market. We
refer to St as the market size, and we assume that it evolves exogenously according to a
Markov process with transition probability function fS(St+1|St). The number of potential
2entrants is proportional to market size: Nout
t = int(δSt),w h e r eδ is a parameter. The
number of incumbent ﬁrms is endogenously determined in the equilibrium of the model.
Each incumbent ﬁrm sells a diﬀerentiated product. Firms compete in prices but also in the
quality of their products.
We consider a logit model of demand for diﬀerentiated products and assume that every
period ﬁrms compete in prices a la Bertrand, as in Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (1992,
pp. 264-266). The equilibrium of this static model of demand and price competition results
in an indirect variable proﬁt function that depends on a ﬁrm’s own product quality, the
competitors’ qualities and market size. Let wit be the quality of ﬁrm i at period t,a n dl e tΩ
be the set of possible product qualities, which is a discrete and ﬁnite set. Deﬁne the vector
nt = {nt(w):w ∈ Ω} where nt(w) is the number of incumbent ﬁrms at period t with quality
w. The equilibrium variable proﬁto fﬁrm i is θvStm(wit,n t)s(wit,n t) where m(wit,n t) and
s(wit,n t) are the retailer’s equilibrium price-cost margin and market share, respectively, and
θv is a parameter that represents the degree of horizontal product diﬀerentiation.
There are two forces that aﬀect the evolution of a retailer’s stock of quality. A ﬁrm can
improve its quality by making additional investments. If the ﬁrm does not invest in quality
improvement, its quality depreciates as the result of increases in the value of the outside
alternative. An incumbent ﬁrm’s investment decision is a binary choice: iit ∈ {0,1},w h e r e
iit =1means positive investment. The transition probability of quality for an incumbent
ﬁrm is fw1(wi,t+1|wit,i it).
Incumbent ﬁrms are also heterogeneous in their investment costs. This source of hetero-
geneity is important in some retail industries where the cost of ﬁnancing new investments
varies signiﬁcantly across ﬁrms. Let γi be the ﬁrm-speciﬁc and time-invariant component
of ﬁrm i’s investment cost. Let Γ be the set of possible investment costs, which is assumed
discrete and ﬁnite. Deﬁne the vector n∗
t = {n∗
t(w,γ):( w,γ) ∈ Ω × Γ} where n∗
t(w,γ) is the
number of incumbent ﬁrms at period t with quality w and investment cost γ. We refer to
n∗
t as the latent market structure because it depends on the distribution of the latent (i.e.,
3unobserved for the researcher) investment costs.
Every period t, incumbent ﬁrms decide their respective investments in quality improve-
ments and whether to remain in the market or exit at the next period. Potential entrants
decide whether to enter or not in the market. Firms make these decisions to maximize ex-
pected discounted intertemporal proﬁts Et(
P∞
j=t β
jΠi,t+j) where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount
factor and Πit is the ﬁrm’s current proﬁt. A potential entrant that decides to stay out of
the market gets zero proﬁts. If he decides to enter, he has to pay at period t an entry cost
θEC + εE,it,w h e r eθEC is the component of entry costs that is common to all the ﬁrms in
the market, and εE,it is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc component which is private information of the ﬁrm,
has zero mean, and is i.i.d. over ﬁrms and over time. The new entrant is not active until
next period. Furthermore, the ﬁrm-speciﬁci n v e s t m e n tc o s ta n dt h ei n i t i a lq u a l i t yo fan e w
entrant are uncertain when the ﬁrm makes its entry decision, and they are not realized until
the next period. Idiosyncratic investment costs are drawn from the discrete density function
fγ with support Γ. The initial quality is a random draw from the probability function fw0.
Current proﬁts of an incumbent ﬁrm that stays in the market are θvStR(wit,n t)−FCit−
ICit.T h eﬁrst term is the variable proﬁt .T h es e c o n dt e r mi st h eﬁxed operating cost: FCit =
θFC + εFC,it,w h e r eθFC is a parameter and εFC,it is a private information shock. The last
term, ICit, represents investment costs for quality improvement: ICit =( θIC+σγγi+εI,it)iit,
where θIC and σγ > 0 are parameters, γi is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component of the investment
cost, which has zero mean and unit variance, and εI,it is private information of ﬁrm i,h a s
zero mean, and is i.i.d. over time and over ﬁrms. The proﬁt of an incumbent ﬁrm that
decides to exit from the market at the end of period t is θvStR(wit,n t) − FCit + εX,it.T h e
exiting ﬁrm is operative during period t, it obtains its variable operating proﬁts and it has
to pay ﬁxed costs. It also receives an exit value εX,it that is private information and has the
same statistical properties as the other ε0s. We assume that the pool of potential entrants is
renewed every period. Therefore, exiting ﬁrms do not become potential entrants the following
period and their continuation value is the value of the best outside alternative, which we
4normalize to zero. Likewise, the continuation value of potential entrants who choose to stay
out of the market upon drawing a large entry cost is also set to zero.
We assume that ﬁrms’ entry, exit and investment strategies depend only on payoﬀ relevant
state variables, i.e., Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). The set {ωit,γi : i =1 ,...,Nin
t }
is common knowledge. The vector of payoﬀ relevant state variables of ﬁrm i is e xit =
(wit,γi,n ∗
t,S t,ε E,it,ε FC,it,ε I,it,ε X,it). The continuation value of an entrant or a staying in-
cumbent as of next period is βE[V (e xit+1) | e xit], w h e r et h ev a l u ef u n c t i o nV is the solution of
a Bellman equation. Following AM, we can show that a MPE can be represented in terms
of players’ choice probabilities conditional on common knowledge state variables. In this
model, there are three free choice probability functions: the probability of entry for a poten-
tial entrant, PE(n∗
t,S t); and, for an incumbent ﬁrm, the probability of exiting the market,
PX(wit,γi,n ∗
t,S t), and the probability of staying and investing in quality, PI(wit,γi,n ∗
t,S t).
Let P =( PE,P X,P I) denote the vector of choice probability functions. These functions
describe a ﬁrm’s behavior as well as its beliefs about the behavior of its opponents. Given
these beliefs, one can interpret each ﬁrm’s problem as a game against nature with a unique
optimal decision rule in probability space, which is the ﬁrm’s best response. The equilibrium
probability function is a ﬁxed point of this best response mapping. Suppose that the private
information shock εE,it has a logistic distribution with dispersion parameter σE, and that the
shocks {εFC,it,ε I,it,ε X,it} have a type I extreme value distribution with dispersion parameter
σX.L e t ˜ θπ be the vector of structural parameters (θv,θFC,θEC,θIC,σγ)0. Then, the best
response of a ﬁrm with beliefs P is given by the following probability functions:
ΨE(n∗
t,S t;P)=e x p
n
zE



















































5are functions of the state (n∗
t,S t) and collect the inﬁnite sum of expected payoﬀs along all pos-
sible future histories originating from that state. These expected payoﬀs are obtained using
beliefs P about current and future behavior and the ’primitive’ probabilities {fw0,f w1,f γ},
and they are discounted by β. Because z0s and λ
0s depend on choice probabilities P,t h e
expressions in (1) describe a ﬁxed-point mapping and the equilibrium probability functions
{PE,PX,PI} are a ﬁxed point of this mapping. Further details including expressions for z0s
and λ
0s can be found in AM and AMR. The model implies that market structure n∗
t follows
a ﬁrst order Markov process.
II. Estimation Method
Consider that we have a sample of M isolated retail markets, where M is large. Our
asymptotic estimation results apply when the number of markets M goes to inﬁnity. For
each market m we observe all the ﬁrms which are active in the market between periods 1and
T.F o re a c hﬁrm i we observe {eim,x im,R imt : t = eim,...,xim},w h e r eeim and xim are the
entry and the exit periods of ﬁrm i, respectively, and Rimt is the revenue of this ﬁrm at
period t. For the incumbents at the initial period t =1we do not know their actual entry
period. We represent these ﬁrms with an entry period equal to one, i.e., eim =1 .F o rt h e
ﬁrms who are still active at the end of period T, we do not know their actual exit period.
We represent these ﬁrms with an exit period equal to T +1 ,i . e . ,xim = T +1 .W e a l s o
observe a measure of market size, Smt. In AMR, we show that, under the assumption that
all the operating costs are ﬁxed, the logit model of demand and price competition can be
used to obtain ﬁrms’ qualities {wit} from ﬁrms’ revenue data. Therefore, we treat qualities
as observable variables. We assume that: (1) a ﬁrm cannot increase his quality if he does
not invest, i.e., fw1(wi,t+1|wit,i it =0 )=0for wi,t+1 ≥ wit;a n d( 2 )i faﬁrm invests, then
his quality does not depreciate, i.e., fw1(wi,t+1|wit,i it =1 )=0for wi,t+1 <w it. Under these
assumptions, a ﬁrm’s quality grows if and only if the ﬁrm invests in quality improvement: i.e.,
iit = I{wi,t+1 ≥ wit}. Therefore, investment is also observable for every period t ≤ T−1.T h e
number of potential entrants is estimated as ˆ Nout
mt = int(ˆ δSmt),w h e r eˆ δ =m a x m,t {¯ emt/Smt}
6is a consistent estimator of δ,a n d¯ emt is the number of entrants at period t.
The structural parameters in the proﬁt function are identiﬁed only up to scale. We use
θπ to denote the vector of identiﬁed structural parameters: θπ ≡ (˜ θ
0
π/σX,σ E/σX).L e tθf
be the vector of structural parameters that characterizes the probability functions fS, fw0
and fw1.N o t e t h a t γi is a standardized random variable, i.e., the mean and the variance
of the heterogenous investment costs are θIC and σ2
γ, respectively. We assume that the
distribution fγ of the standardized heterogeneity γi is known to the econometrician, e.g., it
is a discretized version of the density of a standard normal. That is, we consider distributions
of unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity with only two parameters, mean and variance, such that
the distribution of the standardized heterogeneity is known. This assumption simpliﬁes very
importantly the computation of the maximum pseudo likelihood estimator in our procedure
because it implies global concavity of the pseudo likelihood. Given this assumption, it is
possible to incorporate ﬁrm heterogeneity in any of the other parameters of the model (e.g.,
θv, θFC or θEC) keeping the global concavity of the pseudo likelihood function.
The likelihood function of this model and data has the form
QM
m=1 Lm(θπ,θf),w h e r e
Lm(θπ,θf) is the contribution of market m to the likelihood function. We derive here the
expression of the likelihood Lm. For notational simplicity, we omit the market subindex m.
Also, for the sake of space, we ignore here unobserved market heterogeneity and concentrate
in ﬁrm heterogeneity (see AMR for the description of the NPL with both types of unobserved
heterogeneity). Equilibrium probabilities depend on the ﬁr m ’ so w nt y p ea n do nt h et y p e s
of all the incumbent ﬁrms. Therefore, in order to obtain the likelihood function, we have to
integrate over the distribution of ﬁrms’ types. Let ˜ γ ≡ {γi : i =1 ,2,...,N} be the vector
with the (unobserved) type of each ﬁrm in the sample. Then, L(θπ,θf)=
P
˜ γ∈ΓN Pr(˜ γ)
Pr(Data|˜ γ),a n dPr(Data|˜ γ)=L1(θf)L2(θπ,θf|˜ γ). The function L1(θf) is the likelihood

















This likelihood depends only on the sub-vector θf of the structural parameters, and it does
7not depend on the unobserved types ˜ γ. The function L2(θπ,θf|˜ γ) is the likelihood of the
initial conditions (n1,S 1) and of the history of ﬁrms’ entry, exit and investment decisions
conditional on the vector of ﬁrm types ˜ γ:
























where PNI is the probability of staying in the market without new investments, and ˜ γ1
is the vector of types of the incumbent ﬁrms at the beginning of t =1 . The probability
Pr(n1,S 1|˜ γ1) represents the so-called initial conditions problem. This probability can be
obtained easily from the steady-state equilibrium distribution of the state variables (n∗
t,S t),
i.e., p∗(n∗
t,S t). This steady-state distribution depends on the equilibrium probabilities P and
on the primitives {fS,f w0,f w1} and it can be derived by solving a system of linear equations
(see AM for more details). A property of Pr(n1,S 1|˜ γ1) that is key for the globall concavity
of the pseudo likelihood function that we deﬁne below, is that it depends on the parameters
θπ only through the equilibrium probabilities P.
Given this structure of the full likelihood, we can write the log-likelihood as the sum
of two components: logL(θπ,θf)=l o g L1(θf)+l o g
nP
˜ γ Pr(˜ γ)L2(θπ,θf, ˜ γ)
o
. Following
a standard approach in the estimation of dynamic structural models, we consider partial
maximum likelihood estimation. In a ﬁrst step, we obtain the (partial) maximum likelihood
estimator of θf that maximizes logL1(θf).T h e n , g i v e n ˆ θf, we consider the estimation of
θπ using the partial likelihood log
nP
˜ γ Pr(˜ γ)L2(θπ,ˆ θf, ˜ γ)
o
.T h e ﬁrst step is a standard
problem of maximum likelihood estimation and it does not require one to solve the dynamic
game. We discuss here the estimation of θπ in the second step.
There are three main econometric and computational issues that we have to deal with
to estimate this model: multiple equilibria; the computational cost associated with the
repeated computation of an equilibrium of the model; and integration over all possible
values of ˜ γ.T h e ﬁrst two problems were the main concern in AM. To deal with these
8problems we propose a procedure, that we called Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) that
avoids the repeated solution of the game and that can be used when the model has multiple
equilibria. The main idea of this procedure is relatively simple. While equilibrium prob-
abilities are not unique functions of structural parameters, the best response probabilities
Ψ ≡ {ΨE,ΨI,ΨX}, in equation (1), are always unique functions of structural parameters
and ﬁrms’ beliefs. We use these best response functions to construct a pseudo likelihood
function Q(θπ,P) ≡ log
nP
˜ γ Pr(˜ γ)LΨ
2 (θπ,ˆ θf,P|˜ γ)
o
,w h e r eLΨ
2 () is the likelihood in equa-
tion (3) but where we have replaced equilibrium probabilities by best response probabilities
Ψ,a n dP is the vector of beliefs that we use to evaluate ﬁrms’ best responses. If the
pseudo likelihood function is based on a consistent nonparametric estimator ˆ P of the true
equilibrium beliefs in the population, we can get a two-step estimator that is consistent
and asymptotically normal. However, this two-step method cannot be applied to models
with market or ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity because consistent nonparametric estimates
of choice probabilities are not available for these models. Instead, AM propose the NPL that
is a recursive extension of this two-step method. The NPL procedure starts with an arbitrary
vector ˆ P0. Given these initial probabilities, we generate a sequence of {ˆ θπ,k, ˆ Pk} such that:
(1) ˆ θπ,k =a r g m a x θπ Q(θπ, ˆ Pk−1);a n d( 2 )ˆ Pk = Ψ(ˆ θπ,k, ˆ Pk−1). Upon convergence, this
procedure provides a consistent estimator of the structural parameters. Step (1) is a pseudo
ML estimation and it is very simple task in our model. Given ˆ Pk−1 we can construct the z0s
and λ
0s that appear in the best response probability functions. Furthermore, we use these
probabilities to construct the steady-state distribution of (n∗
t,S t) a n dt h e nt h ep r o b a b i l i t yo f
the initial conditions Pr(n1,S 1|˜ γ1),w h i c ha r eﬁxed during the pseudo-ML estimation. Us-
ing this approach, our pseudo likelihood function Q(θπ,P) is globally concave in θπ for any
value of P, which facilitates very much the computation of the procedure, and guarantees
the consistency of the NPL estimator. Step (2) is a policy iteration, and it consists in the
evaluation of the expressions in the right hand sides of equation (1) using the z0s and λ
0s
from previous iteration k − 1 but the new value of the structural parameters ˆ θπ,k.
9A new computational issue that appears when dealing with unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity
is that we have to integrate over ˜ γ. The dimension of the set ΓN of possible values of ˜ γ
increases exponentially with the number of ﬁrms that we observe in a market, N.F o r
most oligopoly markets, N is small and integration over all ˜ γ
0s may be computationally
inexpensive. For instance, with N =1 0and two types, the number of possible values of ˜ γ
is just 210 =1 ,024. However, with two types and N ≥ 20 we have more than one million
of possible values for ˜ γ. In these cases, simulation techniques can be used to integrate over
the distribution of types. Simulation can be used also to approximate the solution to the
system of linear equations that deﬁnes the z0s and λ
0s in ﬁrms’ best response probabilities,
as in Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007). The combination of these simulation techniques,
that reduce further the cost of estimating these models, with the NPL method, that permits
one to deal with unobserved heterogeneity, is an interesting topic for further research.
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